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The	Brexit	car	crash:	using	EH	Carr’s	What	is	History?
to	explain	the	result
Justin	Frosini	(Bocconi	University)	and	Mark	Gilbert	(Johns	Hopkins	University)	draw	on	EH	Carr’s	seminal
What	is	History?	to	consider	the	root	causes	of	Brexit.	They	identify	three	key	factors:	a	British	preoccupation	with
parliamentary	sovereignty,	the	role	of	the	media	and	the	impact	of	migration	from	Central	Europe.
The	Brexit	vote	was	the	result	of	a	confluence	of	several	social	and	political	causes	–	though	the	debate	over
parliamentary	sovereignty,	which	burst	into	flame	when	Britain	applied	to	join	the	‘Common	Market’	and	has	never
been	doused	since,	permeated	all	of	them.	The	prolonged	debate	over	sovereignty	is	crucial,	since	it	explains	why
17.4	million	British	citizens	not	only	voted	to	leave,	but	in	many	cases	manifestly	rejected	the	EU	even	as	an	ideal.
The	State	Opening	of	Parliament	in	December	2019,	shortly	before	the	UK	left	the	EU.	Photo:
UK	Parliament.	©UK	Parliament/Jessica	Taylor
Why	were	so	many	British	voters	adamant	that	the	EU	was	a	superstate	taking	away	fundamental	rights?	One
answer	might	simply	be	that	there	are	an	awful	lot	of	deluded	nationalist	bigots	in	Britain.	But	this	is	implausible.
Brexit	voters	are	ordinary,	mostly	lower	middle	and	working	class	people	who	live	in	England’s	rural	towns	and
villages,	the	industrial	heartland,	the	ports.	They	are	Victor	Meldrews,	not	Viktor	Orbans.	They	voted	for	both	John
Major	and	Tony	Blair	not	so	long	ago.	Yet	millions	of	them	celebrated	when	Britain	voted	to	leave	in	2016	(and
again	on	Brexit	night	in	January	2020).	Why?
The	June	2016	referendum	result	was	a	car	crash	waiting	to	happen.	We	do	not	use	the	metaphor	casually,	since
the	methodological	frame	for	our	paper	was	provided	by	EH	Carr’s	use,	in	What	is	History?,	of	a	road	accident	to
explain	historical	causality.	Carr	examines	the	case	of	Robinson,	who	is	knocked	down	while	crossing	at	a	blind
corner	where	‘visibility	is	notoriously	poor’	by	Jones,	who	is	returning	from	a	party	where	he	has	‘consumed	more
than	his	usual	ration	of	alcohol’,	and	is	driving	a	car	whose	brakes	are	defective	(Carr	1973:	104–5).
What	is	the	cause	of	Robinson’s	death?	Jones’	drunkenness?	The	blind	corner?	The	faulty	brakes?	The	answer,	of
course,	is	that	these	causes	fatefully	combined.	As	Carr	says,	‘the	historian	deals	in	a	multiplicity	of	causes’	and	the
‘relative	significance	of	one	cause	or	one	set	of	causes	or	of	another,	is	the	essence	of	(a	historian’s)	interpretation’
(Carr	1973:	103).	Most	historians	do	ultimately	identify	one	cause	or	set	of	causes	that	‘in	the	final	analysis’	they
regard	as	overriding	in	any	particular	case	(Carr	1973:	90).	In	the	case	of	Brexit,	the	sovereignty	debate	is	ours.
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Of	course,	chance	and	human	agency	played	a	part	in	the	accident,	too.	Jones	might	have	knocked	someone	else
down	five	minutes	earlier.	Robinson	ought	to	have	looked	right	and	left	before	he	crossed	the	road.	Carr	insisted,
however,	that	we	should	not	waste	excessive	time	on	happenstance.	Scholars	should	construct	their	explanations
primarily	around	‘generalisable	causes’.	They	should	isolate	the	crucial	socio-economic,	intellectual,	institutional,
and	political	variables	of	any	given	case	and	suggest	how	they	combined	over	time	to	produce	a	particular	result.
The	three	generalisable	causes	that	we	concentrate	on	are
(1)	the	deep-rooted	conviction	that	EU	membership	was	incompatible	with	the	doctrine	of	parliamentary
sovereignty;
(2)	the	role	of	the	press;
(3)	mass	migration	into	a	society	that	was	already	experiencing	serious	problems	with	social	injustice.
We	emphasise	that	the	Brexiters’	slogan	Take	Back	Control	was	a	very	effective	way	of	summarising	in	plain
English	a	50-year	debate	about	how	entering	the	Common	Market/European	Union	would	adversely	affect	one	of
the	pillars	of	the	British	constitutional	system,	i.e.	parliamentary	supremacy.	Of	course,	this	is	not	a	debate	unknown
in	other	European	countries	(think	of	the	judgment	handed	down	by	the	German	Federal	Constitutional	Court	a	few
weeks	ago),	but	it	is	particularly	poignant	in	the	UK	because	the	sovereignty	of	Parliament	has	a	similar	significance
to	the	British	as	postwar	constitutions	have	for	the	Germans	and	Italians:	though,	of	course,	parliamentary
sovereignty	is	centuries	older	and	intrinsically	bound	up,	for	some,	with	a	particular	notion	of	British	national	identity.
One	of	the	huge	paradoxes	of	Brexit,	however,	is	that	a	campaign	whose	mainspring	was	giving	back	control	to	the
British	Parliament	has	damaged	parliamentary	sovereignty	by	enhancing	popular	sovereignty.	In	fact,	mixing	a
classic	representative	democracy	with	an	instrument	of	direct	democracy	such	as	a	referendum	gives	rise	to	an
unpalatable	cocktail	where	the	“taste”	of	direct	democracy	is	overpowering.	Whoever	would	have	imagined	the
Daily	Telegraph	opening	with	the	headline	“Judges	versus	the	people”	after	the	famous	High	Court	judgment
concerning	the	triggering	of	Art.	50	TEU?
This	leads	us	to	the	role	of	the	press.	We	contend	that,	especially	after	the	fall	of	Thatcher	in	1990,	the	Eurosceptic
press	used	a	water	torture	method	to	disparage	anything	“European,”	be	it	the	European	Commission,	the	Court	of
Justice	of	the	European	Union,	or	even	the	European	Court	of	Human	Rights,	which	of	course	is	not	even	an	EU
body.	Though	some	headlines	were	amusing	if	you	share	the	British	sense	of	humour,	they	were	part	of	a	strategy
to	intimate	that	British	freedom	was	in	peril.	In	a	nutshell,	the	tabloids	played	an	important	part	in	achieving	Brexit
by	raising	the	profile	of	the	issue	of	lost	sovereignty	with	public	opinion.
Large-scale	migration,	in	particular	from	CEE	countries	following	the	2004	enlargement,	was	grist	to	the	mill.	Many
British	people	believed	that	their	government	and	parliament	no	longer	controlled	their	country’s	border.	This
sentiment	was	exploited	during	the	referendum	by	an	electoral	poster,	redolent	of	Nazi	propaganda,	showing	an
endless	queue	of	refugees,	and	by	fake	news	claims	that	Turkey	was	on	the	brink	of	joining	the	EU.	Again,
however,	the	issue	of	EU	migration	was	not	a	compartmentalised	cause,	but	one	that	added	fuel	to	the	burning
question	of	parliamentary	supremacy.	Brexit	was	perceived	to	be	about	the	most	fundamental	question	of	politics:
who	rules?
The	reference	to	fake	news	underlines	a	key	element	of	contingency	in	the	Brexit	process.	The	Brexiters	were	more
ruthless	and	more	committed	than	the	Remainers.	Farage,	Johnson	and	Gove	were	ideologues	and	Machiavels.
The	Cameron	government,	by	contrast,	was	complacent	about	the	result	and	fearful	of	the	damage	a	Remain	vote
would	have	done	to	party	unity.	The	campaign	swung	decisive	votes	to	the	Brexit	camp.
We	acknowledge	that	the	weight	of	causation	might	be	placed	elsewhere.	In	What	is	History?	Carr	argued	that
historical	interpretation	is	like	looking	at	a	mountain:	it	looks	different	from	every	angle	of	vision	(Carr	1973:	26–27).
Cultural	causes	such	as	the	English	habit	of	defining	themselves	against	a	continental	‘Other’	(Spiering	2014),	or
the	role	of	imperial	nostalgia	both	mattered.	The	strange	death	of	British	social	democracy	mattered	too.	We
mention	David	Goodhart’s	emphasis	on	the	cleavage	between	‘Somewheres’	and	‘Anywheres’	(Goodhart	2017).
These	are	all	legitimate	‘generalisable	causes’	which	other	scholars	might	weigh	heavily	in	the	balance.
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We	plead	guilty	to	sketching	the	mountain	from	one	angle	in	particular.	But	this	angle	is	an	important	one,	since	the
sense	of	liberation	that	many	voters	genuinely	felt	on	24	June	2016,	and	the	tenacity	with	which	Brexiters	have
since	resisted	compromise,	is	inexplicable	unless	you	look	at	Brexit	from	this	point	of	view.
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